Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

The State of Utah v. Tony Alexander Hamilton :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Keith C. Barnes; counsel for appellant.
Brett J. Delporto; assistant attorney general; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Hamilton, No. 200000465.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/652

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Tonyi-Alexander: Hamilton,
a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER
HAMILTON,
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM,
Case No. 200000465-S-C
Defendant-Appellant,
vs.

Priority No. 2

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM
APPEAL FROM FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY
CONVICTION, JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
JUDGE KAY L. McIFF

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Brett I. Delporto (6862)
Assistant Attorney General
160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt iJake City, UT 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

Keith C.Barnes (7136)
Attorney at Law
250 S. Main
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(435) 586-4404
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
p.

UTAH SUPREME COURT

FEB Xh 2661

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Tony-Alexander: Hamilton,
a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER
HAMILTON,
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM,
Case No. 200000465-S-C
Defendant-Appellant,
vs.

Priority No. 2

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM
APPEAL FROM FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY
CONVICTION, JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
JUDGE KAY L. McIFF

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Brett J. Delporto (6862)
Assistant Attorney General
160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

Keith C. Barnes (7136)
Attorney at Law
250 S. Main
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(435) 586-4404
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i
iii

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

V.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL

5

VI.

VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

11

A.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

11

B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

23

VIII. ARGUMENT

27

IX.

50

CONCLUSION
APPELLANT'S ADDENDUM

X.

APPELLANT'S ADDENDUM

000001

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1351.1

000001

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402

000003

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206

000003

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-6

000004

Rules
UTAH

R. Civ. P. 4(c)

000005

Excerpts of Record
Notice of Final Tax Sale dated April 22, 1994, Exhibit 20

000006

Tax Deed dated June 20, 1994, Exhibit 21

000008

Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction against TONY ALEXANDER
HAMILTON entered August 17, 1999, Exhibit 38

000009

Defendant's Motion in Limine filed March 20, 2000

000011

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count 4 filed March 21, 2000

000013

Jury Instruction No. 38

000015

Jury Instruction No. 39

000016

Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment entered May 18, 2000

000017

Notice of Appeal dated May 23, 2000

000022

ii

II.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST, amend. IV

5,41, 42, 46

UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 14

5, 41, 42, 46

Statutes
LAWS OF UTAH, ch. 4 §241
UTAH CODE ANN.

§59-2-1351.1(9)

28
5,28,000001

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402

5, 41,44-45, 45, 46, 000003

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-2-403

6,39

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-2-404

6,39,40

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-4-101

6

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-5-102

7,49

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-5-103

7,40,42

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-5-202

7,36

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-5-203

8,40,41

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-206

8,27, 38, 000003

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-8-305

8, 37

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-9-306

9, 40,47

UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-10-506

9,40

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-1

9,37

UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-7-6

9,38,39-40,000004

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-7

9,39
iii

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-15

10,37,38

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2-2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-32-1

10,30

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-32-2

10,30

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-32-10

10,30

1

Cases
Alisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 1988)

43, 46

American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 Utah App 323, 14 P.3d
698 (2000), cert, granted 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2000)

47 n.l

Anders v. Alfred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965)

43

Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685 (Utah 1989)

43

CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989)

32

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602 P.2d 689
(Utah 1979)
Chris and Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d
511 (Utah 1990)
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997)

32,33
43, 46, 48
2

Durfey v. Board of Education of Wayne County School District, 604
P.2d 480 (Utah 1979)
Eastman v. Gurrey, 49 P. 310 (Utah 1897)

43
28

Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671 (Utah App.
1990)
31-32, 32, 32-33, 33
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah App.
1993)
2
In re Rickenbach's Estate, 112 Utah 278, 186 P.2d 973 (1947)
43
iv

J. H. byD. H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992)

47 n.l

Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, 14
Utah 2d 171, 380 P.2d 721 (1963)
Olsen v. Bagley, 37 P. 739 (Utah 1894)
Peay v. Board of Education ofProvo City School District, 14 Utah
2d 63, 377 P.2d 490 (1962)
Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1996), cert.
denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996)

43
28, 34

43
47 n.l

State v. Alonzi, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997), affd 973 P.2d 975
(Utah 1998)
State v. Archuletta, 526P.2d911 (Utah 1974)
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991)

47 n.l
43
41, 50
37,44,45-46, 46

State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1997)

47 n.l

State v. Griego,933 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1997)

47 n.l

State v.James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991)
State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 1991)
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992)
Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 (1965)
Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751
P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1988)
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982)
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S. Ct. 1240, 10 L.Ed 2d 349
(1963)

3,34
47 n.l
1, 3, 4, 5, 43
43
32
32, 33

41

v

Rules
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 4(c)

11,36,000005

Other
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)

27

VI

III.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter because of its appellate
jurisdiction over "appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996). Judge Kay L. Mclff entered
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment on Defendant/Appellant on May 18, 2000 for five
convictions, including one for a first-degree felony. (000017-21). Defendant entered his
notice of appeal on May 23, 2000. (000022).

IV.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue: Whether Mr. Hamilton's presence on a parcel of land was unlawful and
could support a conviction of criminal trespass when the deed with which the
county purportedly transferred the property from an association of which Mr.
Hamilton was a member, cited a nonexistent Utah state statute as its authority.
Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Hamilton preserved this
issue below by pretrial motion, a motion after the state presented its case and an
objection to a question of the prosecutor that implied the defect had no legal
effect. (000011-12; T-vl p25-26, v3 p710-ll, v4pl73).
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the trial court's rulings on statutory
interpretation and questions of law for correctness and gives no deference to its
conclusions. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992).
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Issue: Whether the court erred when it did not find that the county was estopped to
claim that Mr. Hamilton trespassed on Vance Springs when it had rescinded a
1991 tax sale of the same parcel because notices and the deed cited a nonexistent
Utah statute and when a 1994 tax sale that purported to transfer Vance Springs
from Emmanuel Foundation to Ranger Enterprises cited the same nonexistent
statute in Ranger Enterprise's tax deed.
Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Hamilton preserved this
issue by pretrial motion. (000011-12; T-vl p25-26).
Standard of Review: This issue presents the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which
involves principles of general law. Holland v. Career Service Review Bd., 856
P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993). The Court gives no deference to the trial judge's
determination to questions of law and applies a standard of correctness, deciding
the matter for itself. Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181
(Utah 1997).
Issue: Whether the state presented legally sufficient evidence that Mr. Hamilton's
presence on Vance Springs could constitute criminal trespass when the tax deed
purporting to convey Vance Springs to Ranger Enterprises cited as its authority a
nonexistent Utah statute rendering it void as a matter of law; the ownership of
Vance Springs was still under litigation; and Mr. Hamilton did not participate in
the previous quiet title action.
Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Hamilton preserved this
issue for appellate review by pre-trial motion and motion after presentation of the

state's case and by an objection to a question of the prosecutor, implying the
defect had no legal effect. (000011-12; T-vl p25-26, v3 p710-l 1, v4 pl73).
Standard of Review: As Mr. Hamilton appeals a jury verdict, the Court must
review all the evidence and inferences in favor of the verdict, to determine if the
evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that the jury must have
entertained a reasonable doubt. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 1991).
Issue: Whether the court erred in denying Mr. Hamilton's motion to dismiss the
charge of attempted aggravated murder when Sergeant Chambers was not acting
as a peace officer as a matter of law and Mr. Hamilton's conduct was justified as
acts of self defense in response to a police officer acting wholly outside his scope
of authority.
Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Hamilton preserved this
issue for appellate review by pre-trial motions and motions after presentation of
the state's case. (T-v3 p711-12).
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the trial court's rulings on statutory
interpretation and questions of law for correctness and gives no deference to its
conclusions. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992).
Issue: Whether the court erred in denying Mr. Hamilton's motion to dismiss
charge of killing of a service dog when the Sergeant Chambers was not acting as a
peace officer as a matter of law and thus the dog in question was not a police
service animal as required by the statute.
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Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Hamilton preserved this
issue for appellate review by pre-trial motions and motions after presentation of
the state's case. (000013; T-v3 p711-12).
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the trial court's rulings on statutory
interpretation and questions of law for correctness and gives no deference to its
conclusions. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992).
6.

Issue: Whether the court erred by failing to hold that Mr. Hamilton's leaning a
rifle across a fence, pointed above an approaching sheriff, then telling the
approaching sheriff, "That's far enough," twice but later moving the rifle after the
sheriffs first request to do so could constitute aggravated assault when the
applicable statute requires a threat accompanied by a show of immediate force.
Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Hamilton preserved this
issue for appellate review by motion after presentation of the state's case. (T-v3
p713-15).
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the trial court's rulings on statutory
interpretation and questions of law for correctness and gives no deference to its
conclusions. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992).

7.

Issue: Whether the errors argued above, as a whole, constitute cumulative error
meriting reversal when they should undermine the Court's confidence that a fair
trial was had.
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Citation to the Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: Mr. Hamilton preserved this
issue for appellate review by motions preserving the individual errors. (00001112; T-vl p25-26, v3 p710-12, 13-15, v4 pl73).
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the trial court's rulings on statutory
interpretation and questions of law for correctness and gives no deference to its
conclusions. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992).

V,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF
THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 14.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Statutes
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-2-1351.1(9). See 000001.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-2-402. See 000003
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-403.

Force in arrest.

Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force,
which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to
defend himself or another from bodily harm while making an arrest.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404.

Peace officer's use of deadly force.

(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid
and assistance, is justified in using deadly force when:
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to an in accordance with
the judgment of a competent court in executing a penalty of death;
(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody
following an arrest, where the officer reasonably believes that deadly
force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by
escape; and
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect has committed a felony offense involving the infliction of
death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer
or to others if apprehension is delayed;
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force
is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or
another person.
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by the officer prior
to any use of deadly force under Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(c).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-4-101.

Attempt - Elements of Offense

(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a
substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
6

(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could
have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the
actor believed them to be.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102.

Assault

(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial
bodily injury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious
bodily injury to another.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103.

Aggravated Assault.

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as
defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202.

Aggravated Murder.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of
the following circumstances:
*

*

*

*

(e) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer
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acting under color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting
the defendant's or another's escape from lawful custody;
*

*

*

*

(k) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement
officer, executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official,
firefighter, judge or other court official, juror, probation officer, or
parole officer, and the victim is either on duty or the homicide is
based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, and the
actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds
or has held that official position[.]

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-203.

Murder.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another;
*

*

*

*

(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder,
but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3)[.]
*

UTAH CODE ANN.

*

*

*

§ 76-6-206. See 000003.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305.

Interference with an arresting officer.

A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or
by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a
peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that
person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required
by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or
detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain
from performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-306.

Police service animals - Causing injury or interfering
with handler - Penalties.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Handler" means a law enforcement officer who is
specially trained, and uses a police service animal during the course
of the performance of his law enforcement duties.
(b) "Police service animal" means any dog or horse used by a
law enforcement agency, which is specially trained for law
enforcement work, or any animal contracted to assist a law
enforcement agency in the performance of law enforcement duties.
(2) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to intentionally:
(a) cause bodily injury or death to a police service animal[.]
*

*

*

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-506.

*

Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight
or quarrel.

Every person, except those described in Section 76-10-503, who, not
in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons,
draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening
manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-1.

"Arrest" defined - Restraint allowed.

An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission
to custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint
than is necessary for his arrest and detention.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-6. See 000004.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-7.

Force in making arrest.

If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being
informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting
may use reasonable force to effect an arrest. Deadly force may be
used only as provided in Section 76-2-404.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15.

Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect
- Grounds.

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-1.

Acts and omissions constituting contempt.

The following acts or omission in respect to a court or proceedings
therein are contempts of the authority of the court:
*

*

*

*

(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court.
*

*

*

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-2.

*

Re-entry after eviction from real property.

Every person dispossessed of, or ejected from or out of, any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, who, not having a right to do so, re-enters into or upon,
or takes possession of, any such real property, or induces or procures
any person, not having the right to do so, or aids or abets him
therein, is guilty of a contempt of the court by which such judgment
was rendered, or from which such process issued. Upon a
conviction for such contempt the court must immediately issue an
alias process, directed to the proper officer, requiring him to restore
such possession to the party entitled thereto under the original
judgment or process.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-32-10.

Contempt - Action by court.

Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court shall determine
whether the person proceeded against is guilty of the contempt
charged. If the court finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the
court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the person
incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both.
However, a justice court judge or court commissioner may punish
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for contempt by a fine not to exceed $500 or by incarceration for
five days or both.

Rules
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 4(c). See 000005.

VI.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, defendant, appeals final judgment, sentence and

conviction for attempted aggravated murder, a first degree felony, aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, murder of a service dog, a class A misdemeanor, interference with an
arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor.
A jury returned verdicts of guilty on the counts listed above and a verdict of not guilty for
an additional charge of attempted aggravated murder, a first degree felony, on March 31,
2000. (T-v5 p76-77). Judge Kay L. Mclff of the Fifth Judicial District for Beaver
County entered judgment on May 18, 2000 and sentenced defendant to five years to life
imprisonment. (000017-21). Defendant appealed the convictions to the Utah Supreme
Court. (000022).
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Hamilton's conviction stems from an altercation with law enforcement

officers who entered a parcel of land known as Vance Springs to remove him. In the
early 1980s a group of religiously like-minded individuals formed an association called
the Fraternity of Preparation. (T-vl pi 54, v4 p7). In July 1986, this group formed the
11

Emanuel Foundation, a nonprofit entity to hold and own property used exclusively for
religious purposes. (T-vl pi 53). Emanuel Foundation purchased a 640-acre tract of land
in Beaver County, Utah for approximately $170,000. (T-vl pl50-53). This tract of land
became commonly known as Vance Springs. (T-vl pi51). Mr. Hamilton was a member
of the Fraternity of Preparation in 1984 during the sale negotiations for Vance Springs,
but left the association before the sale closed in 1985. (T-vl pi52, v4 p8, 96-97).
The members of the Foundation and Fraternity recorded several documents in
1986 declaring Vance Springs was not taxable because a non-profit entity owned the
parcel and was using it exclusively for religious purposes. (T-vl pi53-54, 156). Relying
upon a federal statute that they believed stated that a church need not make an application
to a government agency to obtain tax-exempt status, the members of Emanuel Foundation
refused to make a tax-exempt application to the commissioners of Beaver County or meet
with the Utah State tax commission. (T-vl pi57-61). The members met with the county
commissioners numerous times but did not make an application for tax-exempt status to
the county commissioners or the state tax commission because they believed federal law
did not require religious organizations to do so. (T-vl pi63).
In 1990, the county gave the Foundation notice that the property would be sold at
a tax sale unless it paid back taxes of over $5,000. (T-vl pi 69-70). The Foundation
refused to pay the taxes under protest because they believed that such action would place
them under the authority of the state taxing regulations, contrary to the members'
religious beliefs. (T-vl pi78-79). Mr. Hamilton rejoined the Foundation in 1991. (T-v4
p99). In 1991, the county attempted to sell Vance Springs at a tax sale. (T-vl p203, v2
12

p263). However, the county rescinded the sale because the sale notices and deed
prepared for signing cited an old statute number, 59-10-64, no longer in existence, as its
authority to perform the sale. (T-vl p203, v2 p264). The county attorney testified that
the county rescinded the sale on the advice that the state's forfeiture laws were strictly
enforced and any defect would prevent the sale. (T-v2 p264-65).
In 1994, the county conducted a tax sale of Vance Springs with Ranger Enterprises
making the highest bid of $15,000 (including over $10,000 in claimed back taxes.) (T-vl
pi79-80, 189). The deed for the 1994 tax sale contained the same incorrect statute
number as the rescinded 1991 tax sale. (000008; Ex. 15; T-v2 p267-68). However, the
notices contained the correct code provision. (000006-07; T-v2 p272).
The Foundation filed numerous state and federal claims against county officials
regarding their tax-exempt status but the lower court proceedings were dismissed. (T-vl
pi 81-83, v2 p261-62). The state court dismissed the Foundation's claims because the
Foundation would not go through the administrative channels or pay the alleged taxes
under protest. (T-v2 p262). The federal district court dismissed their claims, deferring to
the state court for tax issues. (T-v2 p262). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded
the case back after the members of the Foundation appealed on the basis that the district
court had not assessed the plaintiffs claims on the merits. (T-v4 p20-24, 36-38; Ex. 81).
The district court dismissed the action on remand based upon a statute of limitations
defect. (T-v4 p38, 197; Ex. 82).
Ranger Enterprises brought a quiet title action in June of 1996 against the
Foundation. (T-v2 p275-77). Testimony established that the court would not let the
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members of the Fraternity who controlled the Foundation represent the Foundation
without an attorney. (T-v4 p26). When the members attempted to appear without
representation, the court entered a default judgment against the Foundation and enjoined
the members and the Foundation from entering or remaining on Vance Springs. (T-v2
p278, 282, v4 p25).
In August 1996, Mr. Hamilton was charged with two counts of criminal trespass
on Vance Springs. (Ex 23, 25). The transcript indicates that the owner of Ranger
Enterprises, James Eldredge, and his son, Donald Eldredge, confronted Mr. Hamilton
with guns on Vance Springs on July 21, 1996. (T-v4 pi09). This confrontation resulted
in Mr. Hamilton's need for medical care for some stitches. (T-v4, pi 10-11). Both parties
made criminal reports, Mr. Hamilton for aggravated assault, the Eldredges for trespass.
(Ex. 23; T-v4 p i l l , 175-77). In September 1996, Beaver County charged Mr. Hamilton
with criminal trespass and interference with an arresting officer following a subsequent
action to remove Mr. Hamilton from Vance Springs. (Ex. 25; T-v2 p253). Beaver
County law enforcement officers came on to Vance Springs to remove Mr. Hamilton and
the charge of interference consisted of Mr. Hamilton's act of holding onto a bar or handle
on a stove while officers attempted to remove him. (Ex. 25) (T-v2 p271-72).
The county court held one trial in November for the events of July and September.
(T-v2, p268). Mr. Hamilton represented himself, appearing to not take any advantage of
an appointed attorney on hand to assist him. (T-v2 p252-54, 268). Testimony indicates
that Mr. Hamilton did not assert any defenses based upon any defect in Ranger
Enterprise's title. (T-v2 p270). A jury found him guilty of all counts and the judge
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credited jail time as time served and enjoined Mr. Hamilton from entering Vance Springs
for one year. (Exs. 24, 26).
Mr. Hamilton then filed two actions in 1997. (T-v4 pi 19). He brought a state
action against James and Donald Eldredge and the county assessor, who came with them
to Vance Springs, regarding the alleged assault. (T-v4 pi 19). The federal judge
dismissed this case. (T-v4 pi 19). One month later, Mr. Hamilton filed an action alleging
kidnapping and being held 54 days without arraignment, naming county officials and
county law enforcement officers. (T-v4 pi 19-20, 168-70, 189). The federal judge
dismissed this claim. (T-v4 pi20). Mr. Hamilton did not appeal, but a few months later
filed another suit including the federal judge as a named party and alleging obstruction of
justice and deprivation of rights. (T-v4 p.121). Following the district court's dismissal,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed this action on August 3, 1999. (T-v4 pl21,
168). Mr. Hamilton had 90 days to appeal to the United States Supreme Court, and he
subsequently sent the Court a document as a notice of appeal in October of 1999. (T-v4
pl6;Ex. 83).
In March and April of 1999, Mr. Hamilton recorded numerous documents with the
county recorder, including two documents entitled "warranty deed" and "land patent," all
regarding Vance Springs. (T-v2 p282, v4 pl23-24, 190-91). The face of the warranty
deeds appears to grant Vance Springs from Emanuel Foundation to Mr. Hamilton. (T-v4
pi 24) Mr. Hamilton, as president of the Foundation, and the secretary both signed one
deed for the Foundation as grantor; only the secretary signed for the Foundation on the
second deed. (T-v4 pi24). Mr. Hamilton also filed a criminal trespass action in June
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1999 against Ranger Enterprises in federal district court based upon the land patent he
had filed. (T-v4 pi24-25).
In 1999, Ranger Enterprises brought a quiet title action against "TONY
ALEXANDER HAMILTON." (000009-10; T-v2 p281, v4 pi79-80). Mr. Hamilton
maintained the notice did not inform him because he believes that conventions of writing
determine that names in all capitals refer only to deceased or fictitious people. (T-v4
pl61-62, 180-81). Ranger Enterprises subsequently obtained a default judgment and a
permanent injunction to prevent the named party from recording any more documents.
(000009-10). In early September 1999, Donald Eldridge, who inherited Vance Springs
from his father, asked Beaver County law enforcement officers to visit Vance Springs to
see if people were living there as others had informed him and to arrest those people for
trespass if they were there. (T-v2 p279-80, 283).
On September 2, 1999, Beaver County Deputy Sheriff Goodwin cut through a
fence surrounding the property and drove to the cabins and trailers located inside. (T-v2
p442, 446). The deputy found two friends of Mr. Hamilton on the property. (T-v2
p443). The deputy informed them that they were trespassing and agreed to allow them
four days to leave the property. (T-v2 p445-46). One of the friends, Ms. Georgia Lee,
told the deputy that Mr. Hamilton was not on the property and agreed to tell him that they
were to leave in the next few days. (T-v2 p447). Subsequently Mr. Hamilton repaired
the fence and placed a trailer in front of the gate to keep out people and cattle. (T-v4
pl31). Mr. Hamilton also told his friends that ownership of Vance Springs was still
under litigation and he did not intend to leave. (T-v4 pl31).
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On September 9, 1999, the Beaver County sheriff, Sheriff Yardley, a Beaver
County deputy, Deputy Goodwin, a Beaver County sergeant deputy, Sergeant Chambers
and a deputy who covered parts of three sparsely populated counties (including the
eastern part of Beaver County where Vance Springs is located), Deputy White, met and
drove toward Vance Springs in three vehicles to investigate whether anyone was still on
Vance Springs. (T-v2 p452-53, v3 p503-04). Sergeant Chambers brought his police
service dog, which had been trained as an attack or aggression dog. (T-v2 p540). While
driving there, Deputy Goodwin recognized Mr. Hamilton's friends driving past. (T-v2
p453). Deputy Goodwin and Sheriff Yardley stopped the car the friends were driving
and concluded that they were on their way to town to do laundry. (T-v2 p454). The
other two vehicles with deputies continued. (T-v2 p455). Mr. Lee asked if the officers
had a warrant. (T-v2 p454). Deputy Goodwin responded he did not and the friends
drove off away from Vance Springs. (T-v2 p454).
Earlier that day, Mr. Hamilton had gone to the pond on Vance Springs with a .410
shotgun and a .223 Mini 14 to shoot birds that had been preying on pond fish. (T-v4
pi33). Mr. Hamilton fired two shots from the .223 rifle and put the empty casings in his
pocket. ( T-v4 pi 33). After his friends left, he busied himself in one of the houses on
Vance Springs and then left to drive to the pond in his blue pickup to dig weeds. (T-v4
pl35).
The sheriff and deputy continued to Vance Springs and saw Deputy White with
his and Sergeant Chamber's vehicles parked by a padlocked gate. (T-v2 p455). The
sheriff and two deputies climbed the gate and entered the property on foot from the
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southeast and walked toward the structures. (T-v2 p455-56). One of the deputies,
Sergeant Chambers, already had climbed a rise on foot with his dog to determine if he
could see if anyone was on the property. (T-v2 p455, v3 p613). Sergeant Chambers
noticed dust rising from a vehicle, but he was unable to contact the other officers and
drove around to the north gate of the property. (T-v3 p615).
While walking on the property, the three officers noticed Mr. Hamilton driving a
blue Ford pickup going in a western direction away from them. (T-v2 p457-58). This
truck stopped, turned around to face them, waited a few minutes and then turned around
again and proceeded to the west. (T-v2 p458-59). Mr. Hamilton recognized two of the
officers and decided he did not want a confrontation with them and continued to the
pond. (T-v4 pl36-37). Deputy Goodwin assumed that the driver was Mr. Hamilton and
radioed Sergeant Chambers that he thought Mr. Hamilton was heading for a gate on the
north side. (T-v2 p460). Sergeant Chambers responded that he was en route to that gate.
(T-v2 p460-61). Sergeant Chambers radioed Deputy Goodwin that he was at the north
gate and it was barricaded. (T-v3 p480). Sergeant Chambers then entered on foot with
his dog. (T-v3 p616-17). The three officers continued to the area with buildings where
the friends were before and found no one there. (T-v2 p461-62). The officers then split
up to investigate outbuildings and a wooded area to the north where they believed Mr.
Hamilton might try to hide. (T-v3 p476-77).
Sergeant Chambers thought that the driver of the truck might be heading for a rock
cabin near a pond area where he had seen a few weapons stored three years earlier. (T-v3
p618-19, 627). Mr. Hamilton was at the pond digging weeds up and saw Sergeant
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Chambers and his dog approach. (T-v4 pi38). Chambers saw the truck parked a short
distance from the rock cabin, saw one person get into the truck, whom he recognized as
Mr. Hamilton, and drive towards him. (T-v3 p619). He then radioed Deputy Goodwin to
state that the blue truck was at a pond, so the two other deputies started walking toward
the pond. (T-v3 p480).
Mr. Hamilton drove toward Sergeant Chambers to determine if he had any warrant
for his arrest. (T-v4 pi39). He testified that the dog lunged toward the truck and
Sergeant Chambers held it back by a leash. (T-v4 pi39) However, Sergeant Chambers
testified that he did not bring a leash with him onto Vance Springs. (T-v3 p617). Mr.
Hamilton decided that he did not want to have a confrontation with Sergeant Chambers
and his dog and started to drive away. (T-v4 pi39). The truck came within eight to ten
feet from him and turned in a semi-circle and Chambers saw that Mr. Hamilton had no
weapon in his hands. (T-v3 p620-21). Sergeant Chambers told Mr. Hamilton to stop the
truck, which Mr. Hamilton testified that he did not hear and continued to circle and head
back the way he came. (T-v3 p621-22, v4 pi40).
Sergeant Chambers then drew his service revolver and fired three shots at the tires
on the left hand side, shooting out both. (T-v2 p413, v3 p623). Deputy Goodwin heard
the shots, which surprised him because he had arrested Mr. Hamilton in the past and Mr.
Hamilton had never displayed combative behavior toward the officers. (T-v3 p480, 50102).

Deputy Goodwin testified that if he had expected Mr. Hamilton was going use or

access weapons, he would have ensured that each officer had a rifle and vest. (T-v3
P 514).
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As the deputies ran toward the shots, Sergeant Chambers again radioed to inform
them that the truck was going in their direction with two flat tires, at which point they
saw the truck approaching and then turn away. (T-v3 p481). Sergeant Chambers then
claimed that after firing his service pistol he let his dog run ahead of him toward the
direction of the truck to allow it to have a drink of water from the pond. (T-v3 p630).
Mr. Hamilton drove the truck until he worried about damaging the wheel rims and then
saw the dog was loose. (T-v4 pl41). The dog jumped into the pond and then jumped
back out. (T-v4 pi41). Mr. Hamilton exited the truck with a Ruger Mini 14 .223 rifle
and fearing that Sergeant Chambers would turn his dog on him, shot at the dog. (T-v3
p482, 632, v4 pl42). The first rifle shot missed the dog, but Mr. Hamilton's second shot
hit the dog, which had started to move laterally from Mr. Hamilton's perspective toward
Sergeant Chambers. (T-v3 p507, 632). The assistant to the veterinarian who performed
the necropsy testified that that the veterinarian determined that the dog died of
exsanguination from the only gunshot wound, which entered near the anus and exited the
abdomen. (T-v2 p 344-46).
The state's evidence differs on the sequence of these few events. Deputy
Goodwin testified that he heard Mr. Hamilton's first shot followed by several handgun
shots. (T-v3 p506). Then after the second rifle shot, Deputy Goodwin heard Sergeant
Chambers yell, "You mother fucker. You killed my dog. Tony, you are a dead man."
(T-v3 p484). He then heard Sergeant Chambers discharge his weapon in short bursts
numerous times. (T-v3 p484). Investigators found five holes from .40 caliber rounds
fired that struck the front of the truck. (T-v2 p325-27). Sergeant Chambers testified that

Mr. Hamilton fired two shots at his dog, striking it on the second shot, then Mr. Hamilton
fired two shots at Chambers before Chambers yelled and fired. (T-v3 p632-34).
Mr. Hamilton testified that after he shot the dog, Sergeant Chambers hollered at
him and then started firing at him. (T-v4pl43-44). He hid behind the pickup truck. (Tv4 pl43-44). He testified that bullets struck the truck body as he hid. Investigators found
five holes from a .40 caliber weapon fired toward the front of the truck. (T-v4 pi 44).
Mr. Hamilton testified that Sergeant Chambers reloaded and shot again, moving toward
the dog and exposing Mr. Hamilton's cover behind the truck. (T-v4 pl45-46). He then
testified that he fired two warning shots in front of Sergeant Chambers and when
Sergeant Chambers continued to move toward the dog, exposing Mr. Hamilton's cover,
he discharged the last shot he fired, aiming for Sergeant Chamber's leg. (T-v4 pi45).
Mr. Hamilton shot the final rifle round from a distance of approximately 150 yards
away, striking Chambers in the lower right leg. (T-v3 p484, 636, 639-41). Sergeant
Chambers fell to the ground and radioed Deputy Goodwin that he had been injured. (Tv3 p484-85). Neither Sergeant Chambers nor Mr. Hamilton discharged any firearm after
the rifle shot that struck Sergeant Chambers. (T-v4 pi46). Deputy Goodwin, also an
EMT, withdrew from the area cut the fence and drove his vehicle to Sergeant Chambers.
(T-v3 p485-87). A medical helicopter subsequently airlifted Sergeant Chambers to a
hospital and he sustained permanent injury to his lower right leg. (T-v2 p366, 402-03).
Later examination of Sergeant Chamber's three magazines revealed that two were
empty and one had eight rounds left in the ten round magazine. (T-v2 p411, 424, v3
p665). Investigators recovered fourteen empty handgun shell casings of the possible 22
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that may have been fired. (T-v2 p424). Besides the two .223 casings in Mr. Hamilton's
pocket, investigators recovered four casings at the scene of the incident. (T-v 2 p423).
After Sergeant Chambers fell to the ground, Mr. Hamilton left the truck with the
rifle and walked south with the rifle strapped on his shoulder. (T-v3 p571, v4 pi47).
Sheriff Yardley located Mr. Hamilton by the south fence line about 150 yards away from
his own position. (T-v3 p528). Mr. Hamilton asked if the officer was Sheriff Yardley
and Sheriff Yardley answered affirmatively. (T-v3 p528). Sheriff Yardley walked to
within about 70 yards of Mr. Hamilton, at which time Mr. Hamilton told the sheriff that
was close enough. (T-v3 p529). Mr. Hamilton was resting the rifle on the fence, pointed
in the direction of Sheriff Yardley. (T-v3 p529). The two attempted to communicate but
the distance was too great, so the sheriff walked to within 30 yards and Mr. Hamilton told
him that was close enough again. (T-v3 p530). Mr. Hamilton and Sheriff Yardley talked
for about a half hour. (T-v3 p531). Sheriff Yardley asked Mr. Hamilton if he had the
rifle pointed at him and Mr. Hamilton stated that it was pointed above him. (T-v3 p531,
v4 pi49). The sheriff asked Mr. Hamilton to point his rifle elsewhere, which Mr.
Hamilton did. (T-v3 p531). During the conversation, Mr. Hamilton told the sheriff that
Sergeant Chambers shot at him and he had returned fire and shot him. (T-v3 p533, v4
pl48).
Deputy White then appeared and came as close to Mr. Hamilton as the sheriff. (Tv3 p533-34). Mr. Hamilton expressed his desire to open the east gate so the sheriff could
assist Sergeant Chambers but refused to go back on the property himself. (T-v3 p533, v4
pi 50). The sheriff then went back on the property but did not find any other officers. (T
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- v.3 p534-35). Deputy White testified that Mr. Hamilton told him that he shot the dog
when Sergeant Chambers had let it loose to attack him. (T - v.3 p574). He also claimed
that he shot Chambers in defense of his life. (T-v3 p574, v4 pi 55). The sheriff met Mr.
Hamilton and Deputy White at the east gate and they discovered that Deputy Goodwin's
truck had been removed. (T-v3 p536). Deputy Goodwin used the truck to remove
Sergeant Chambers from Vance Springs. (T-v3 p485-87). Mr. Hamilton then declined to
open the east gate, told the officers that he did not wish to talk anymore and began to
walk away. (T-v3 p536). Sheriff Yardley followed Mr. Hamilton and Deputy White
subsequently tackled Mr. Hamilton from behind, whereupon both officers took Mr.
Hamilton into custody after a struggle. (T-v3 p537).

VII.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Mr. Hamilton's presence on Vance Springs on September 9th, 1999 was not

unlawful and could not support a conviction of criminal trespass as a matter of law. Utah
law requires that a defendant enter or remain on property "unlawfully" to be found guilty
of criminal trespass. Beaver County did not convey ownership of Vance Springs from
Emmanuel Foundation, of which Mr. Hamilton is a member, to Ranger Enterprises with
the 1994 tax sale because the deed prepared from that sale cited a nonexistent statute as
authority to execute the deed. Utah case law requires strict compliance with tax sale
statutes for a tax sale to be effective. The 1994 tax deed did not strictly comply with the
tax statutes because it did not draw upon the proper statutes that authorize the sale;
instead it attempted to garner authority from a nonexistent statute. The tax sale was,
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therefore, void and Mr. Hamilton was not unlawfully present on Vance Springs on that
basis.
Likewise, Mr. Hamilton was not unlawfully present on Vance Springs because of
previous convictions of criminal trespass on Vance Springs. He fully complied with the
probation term of staying away from Vance Springs for one year. Finally, the quiet title
action brought by Ranger Enterprises, and subsequent default judgment did not render
Mr. Hamilton's presence unlawful because he contends he was not properly named in the
summons and was not a party. Therefore, Mr. Hamilton did not participate in these
actions and did not present a defense based upon the tax deed defect. The court based its
default judgment on a void document, the 1994 tax deed. Moreover, his "disregard" of
the subsequent default judgment merely made him answerable to contempt charges and
not criminal charges. In light of these facts, Mr. Hamilton's presence on Vance Springs
was not "unlawful" and the court erred in putting the charge of criminal trespass before
the jury.
2.

The trial court erred by not finding that the county was estopped from asserting

that Mr. Hamilton was criminally trespassing on Vance Springs based on the 1994 tax
sale. The county had rescinded a 1991 tax sale of Vance Springs because notices and the
tax deed cited a nonexistent Utah statute as authority to make that sale. The county stated
its opinion that the tax sale statutes must be strictly complied with and took the position
that a tax sale that cited a nonexistent statute as its authority would be void. Mr.
Hamilton reasonably relied upon this position by continuing to assert his ownership over
Vance Springs after the county conducted a 1994 tax sale with a deed that cited the same
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erroneous statute number as giving it authority to conduct the sale. The injustice
contemplated by allowing the county to change its position should entitle Mr. Hamilton
to invoke estoppel.
3.

The jury erred in finding Mr. Hamilton guilty of criminal trespass when the state

did not present legally sufficient evidence that Mr. Hamilton's presence on Vance
Springs constituted criminal trespass. The state presented evidence that Mr. Hamilton's
presence was unlawful and constituted criminal trespass based upon the 1994 tax sale, his
subsequent convictions for trespass on Vance Springs, and several quiet title actions. The
county removed Mr. Hamilton based upon a tax deed that did not strictly comply with the
tax sale statutes, and thus was void as a matter of law. Mr. Hamilton represented himself
at his first trial for criminal trespass and did not assert any defense based upon the tax
deed defect. He complied with his probation terms by keeping off Vance Springs for one
year. Mr. Hamilton did not consider himself a party to any of the subsequent quiet title
actions, which were all granted by default without an adverse party asserting the tax deed
defect. Furthermore, the court in these actions assumed the validity of the 1994 void tax
deed. In light of the tax sale defect, the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to
support a jury verdict of guilty to criminal trespass.
4.

The court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of attempted aggravated murder.

Sergeant Chambers was not acting as a peace officer as a matter of law when he opened
fire on Mr. Hamilton's truck while Mr. Hamilton was driving. His use of his firearm was
wholly outside the scope of his authority. Furthermore, after Mr. Hamilton shot
Chambers' dog, he acted wholly outside of his authority by verbally threatening Mr.
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Hamilton's life and firing his service revolver, constituting the use of deadly force, when
deadly force was unjustified to confront an act that was at most a class A misdemeanor.
Finally, this error was compounded by the court's instruction that hindered Mr.
Hamilton's complete justification of his actions as acts of self defense.
5.

The court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of killing a service animal because

the dog ceased being a police service dog when the dog's handler acted wholly outside
the scope of his authority and was not acting as a peace officer as a matter of law.
6.

The court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of aggravated assault against

Sheriff Yardley. The state's evidence merely established that Mr. Hamilton rested a rifle
across a fence and then the sheriff approached from that direction. Additionally, the
evidence shows that the rifle was not aimed at the sheriff, but pointed above him. Mr.
Hamilton told the sheriff he was close enough twice, once at a distance of 70 yards and
then at 30 yards. Each time the two parties talked or attempted to talk after Mr.
Hamilton's comment. Additionally, when asked by the sheriff, Mr. Hamilton stated that
the rifle was not pointed at him and moved it when requested to do so. The applicable
statute requires a threat accompanied by an immediate show of force or violence. The
fact that the rifle rested in the direction from which the sheriff approached does not
constitute an immediate show of force or violence, even if Mr. Hamilton's comment is
interpreted as a threat. The fact that Mr. Hamilton stated that the rifle was not pointed at
the sheriff and moved it when asked to do so nonetheless reveals that the rifle's resting
position could not be an immediate show of force. Because Mr. Hamilton's conduct did
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not meet the statutory elements as a matter of law, the court erred in submitting the count
of aggravated assault to the jury.
7.

The errors argued above, individually or as a whole, constitute cumulative error

meriting reversal because they should reasonably undermine the Court's confidence that
Mr. Hamilton was granted a fair trial.
VIII. ARGUMENT
1.
Mr. Hamilton's presence on a parcel of land was not unlawful
and, therefore, could not support a conviction of criminal trespass when the deed
with which the county purportedly transferred the property from an association, of
which Mr. Hamilton was a member, cited, as its authority, a nonexistent Utah state
statute.

The state charged Mr. Hamilton with criminal trespass in violation of UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 76-6-206(2)(a). (T-vl pl24-25). The statute as it existed under Mr.
Hamilton's case, and as it currently appears as amended, requires proof that an individual
entered or remained on property "unlawfully." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206(2)(a) (1999
& Supp. 2001). Black's Law Dictionary defines "unlawful" as "not authorized by law."
Black's Law Dictionary 1536 (7th ed. 1999). However, Mr. Hamilton, as a member of
the Brothers of Fraternity and Emanuel Foundation, is entitled to enter and remain on
property that it owns. There is nothing unlawful about entering or remaining on one's
own land.
The prosecution attempted to show that a June 20, 1994 tax sale extinguished
Emanuel Foundation's ownership of Vance Springs. (000008; T-v5 p.57). Utah case law
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has long held that sale of land for the nonpayment of taxes requires strict compliance
with the authorizing statutes. Olsen v. Bagley, 37 P. 737, 740 (Utah 1894).
Tax sales are made exclusively under statutory power, and, unless all
the necessary prerequisites of the statute are carried out, the tax sale
becomes invalid. If one of the prerequisites fail, it is as fatal as if all
failed. The power vested in a public officer to sell land for the
nonpayment of taxes is a naked power, not coupled with an interest,
and every prerequisite to the exercise of the power must precede its
exercise. The title to be acquired under statutes authorizing the sale
of land for the nonpayment of taxes is regarded as stricti juris, and
whoever sets up a tax title must show that all the requirements of the
law have been complied with.

Id, (citations omitted), accord Eastman v. Gurrey, 49 P. 310, 312 (Utah 1897).
The deed prepared for the 1994 tax sale explicitly states that the Beaver County Auditor
acknowledged to the Beaver County Recorder that his only authority to execute the tax
deed arises from "Section 59-10-64, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and acts supplementary
thereto." (000008). However, UTAH CODE ANN. 59-10-64 has not been in effect since
1987 when the legislature renumbered that section. See LAWS OF UTAH, ch. 4 §241.
Plainly, the Auditor and Recorder did not and could not show that they had complied
with all the requirements of the law to exercise this naked power when they expressly
draw upon a nonexistent statute as their authority. For this reason alone, the tax deed and
tax sale of 1994 are void and ineffective.
Additionally, the correct statute enabling the state to sell and convey proper tax
titles states that the deed "shall be substantially in the following form,5 designating a tax
deed form that does not include a recitation of authority. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-21351.1(9)(e). Beaver County officials' inclusion of a incorrect citation of authority
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deviates substantially in two separate respects: it purports to cite the authority to execute
the deed and it fails to correctly cite UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1351 as its authority to do
so. (000008). Considering the necessity for a strict compliance with tax sale statutes, the
1994 tax deed must be void and ownership did not transfer from Emanuel Foundation to
Ranger Enterprises.
The prosecution may erroneously try to argue that two separate events made Mr.
Hamilton's presence on Vance Springs on September 9, 1999 "unlawful." First, the
prosecution may reference Mr. Hamilton's November 1996 convictions of criminal
trespass on Vance Springs. (Exs. 24, 26). However, as a condition of probation Mr.
Hamilton could not enter Vance Springs for a period of one year. (T-v4 pi 17, 178-79).
Mr. Hamilton began living on Vance Springs well after he complied with that condition
of probation and it had expired. (T-v4 pi 17-19). The county based Mr. Hamilton's
convictions of criminal trespass on an ineffective tax title that Ranger Enterprises claimed
gave them ownership over Vance Springs and prompted the criminal trespass
prosecutions. (Exs. 23, 25). The failure of Mr. Hamilton to present a defense based upon
the defective tax sale while representing himself and his subsequent decision to comply
with all probation terms and return to Vance Springs after one year did not render his reentry on Vance Springs "unlawful" in 1999.
Second, the prosecution may claim that Ranger Enterprises 1999 quiet title action
and subsequent default judgment made Mr. Hamilton's presence on Vance Springs
"unlawful." (000009-10). There are several reasons why this default judgment did not
render Mr. Hamilton's presence unlawful. As mentioned above, Mr. Hamilton claimed
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that there was a discrepancy of service because the summons and complaint addressed
themselves to "TONY-ALEXANDER HAMILTON/5 which in Mr. Hamilton's view
denotes a deceased or fictitious person. (T-v4 pi 80-81). The Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure require that summons contain the names of the parties to the action. UTAH R.
Civ. P. 4(C)(1). Mr. Hamilton maintains that his name was not included on the summons
and he was not properly served with the quiet title action.
As defense counsel argued in his motion, Mr. Hamilton's decision to disregard the
summons and the subsequent default judgment merely placed Mr. Hamilton in jeopardy
of contempt of court, not criminal prosecution. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-1; § 7832-2; § 78-32-10; (T-v3 p711). The fact that a court contempt action might have been
asserted against Mr. Hamilton, assuming he was even the named defendant in that quiet
title action, does not give rise to the finding that he entered or remained on the property
"unlawfully" if the court awarded that default judgment to Ranger Enterprises based upon
a void deed. The trial court that entered the default judgment, based its ruling on the void
tax sale and void tax deed, which supported Ranger Enterprise's assertion of ownership
over Vance Springs and was uninformed of any defense on this basis because Mr.
Hamilton did not appear. (T-v2 p281). Mr. Hamilton's right to remain on his own
property should not be rendered "unlawful" by a court preceding that based its ruling on a
void document, without the presentation of a defense by Mr. Hamilton, and arguably
without his legal inclusion in the proceeding.
2.
The court erred in failing to hold that Beaver County was equitably
estopped from claiming Mr. Hamilton trespassed on Vance Springs when it
rescinded a 1991 tax sale of the same parcel because notices and the deed cited a
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nonexistent Utah statute when a 1994 tax sale that purported to transfer Vance
Springs from Emmanuel Foundation to Ranger Enterprises cited the same
nonexistent statute in Ranger Enterprises tax deed.

The trial court erred by failing hold that equitable estoppel prevented the
government from claiming that Mr. Hamilton criminally trespassed on September 9, 1999
on the basis of the 1994 tax deed. In 1991, Beaver County attempted to sell Vance
Springs at a tax sale but decided to rescind the sale. (T-v2 p265-66). The county
rescinded the sale because it used the wrong statute number in the tax sale notices and the
deed prepared for the tax sale. (Ex. 15; T-v2 p264-66). The notices and deed referenced
a nonexistent statute number and the county attorney determined that error voided the tax
sale. (T-v2 p268). The county attempted to sell Vance Springs at another tax sale in
1994. (T-v2 p266). The notices contained the correct statute number, but the deed
referenced the same nonexistent statute. (000006-08). The repetition of the same error in
preparing the tax deed should prevent the government from asserting that Mr. Hamilton
criminally trespassed on September 9, 1999 on the basis equitable estoppel.
The Utah Court of Appeals outlined the elements of equitable estoppel in Eldredge
v. Utah State Retirement Bd.:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or
inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the
second party that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to
act.

^1

Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) (citing
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989); Celebrity
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm % 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979); Utah Dep't
ofTransp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988)).
Beaver County rescinded the 1991 tax sale, acknowledging that the citations to the
nonexistent statute rendered the tax sale void because the tax sale statutes require strict
adherence. (T-v2 p264-66). This action satisfies the first element of estoppel because it
is inconsistent with the county's later assertion that the 1994 tax sale was valid. It is
inconsistent because the tax deed contains the same faulty statute number authorizing the
county's execution of the deed that the invalidated 1991 tax deed contained. (000008;
Ex. 15). Mr. Hamilton reasonably relied on the government's prior representations that
no valid tax sale occurred where the tax deed asserted as authority for the sale the
nonexistent statute. (T-v4 p. 103, 172-74). Mr. Hamilton stands charged of criminal
trespass on the disputed land; the injury to Mr. Hamilton's freedom and reputation by
allowing the county to repudiate its position that these erroneous and incorrect citations
of authority render a tax sale void, leaves Mr. Hamilton's personal and legal interests
seriously injured.
A person may assert estoppel against the government in limited circumstances,
"where it is plain that the interests of justice so require." Eldredge v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Utah State Univ. v. Sutro
& Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982)). In these cases the Court must determine if the
"facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient
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gravity, to invoke the exception." Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 675 (quoting Sutro, 646 P.2d at
720)). It is certain that Beaver County rescinded the 1991 tax sale because it determined
that references to the nonexistent statute number invalidated the tax sale. (T-v2 p266). It
is also certain that Beaver County officials made the same mistake again in the 1994 tax
deed by including the same nonexistent statute number referenced in the 1991 tax deed.
(000008; Ex. 15). Mr. Hamilton's reasonable reliance on the county's construction of the
tax statute requirements entitled him to regard the 1994 tax sale as void as a matter of
law.
These plain facts are highlighted by the gravity this repudiation will visit upon Mr.
Hamilton. Mr. Hamilton stands to be convicted of criminally trespassing on land that is
his, through membership in the Emmanuel Foundation or the subsequent warranty deed
from that Foundation to himself, if this Court approves the county's change in position.
Utah courts allowed equitable estoppel against the government when business licenses
and retirement benefits have been at stake. See Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Comm 'n, 602 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1979); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
795 P.2d 671, 672-73 (Utah App. 1990). The certainty of a criminal conviction and loss
of liberty, if not the loss of ownership of land, rises to the level of injustice that demands
the invocation of equitable estoppel.

3.
The state did not present legally sufficient evidence that Mr.
Hamilton's presence on Vance Springs constituted criminal trespass when the tax
deed purporting to convey Vance Springs to Ranger Enterprises cited as its
authority a nonexistent Utah statute rendering it void as a matter of law, Mr.
Hamilton's presence did not violate any probation terms of his previous convictions
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of trespass on Vance Springs, and Mr. Hamilton did not participate in the previous
quiet title actions.
The jury verdict against Mr. Hamilton was not supported by sufficient evidence.
Since he appeals a jury verdict, the Court must review all the evidence and inferences in
favor of the verdict, to determine if the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt. State v. James, 819
P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 1991). The prosecution submitted an assortment of documents in
an attempt to show that Mr. Hamilton's presence on Vance Springs was unlawful, and
therefore, criminal trespass. The prosecution entered into evidence the 1994 tax deed that
purportedly sold Vance Springs at a tax sale to Ranger Enterprises; a 1996 quiet title
action brought by Ranger Enterprises against the Foundation and Fraternity; two prior
convictions for criminal trespass in 1996 made on behalf of Ranger Enterprises and
joined in one trial; and a 1999 quiet title action brought by Ranger Enterprises against
"TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON." (000008, 000009-10; Exs. 24, 26, 82).
However, every one of the court proceedings relies on and assumes the
authenticity of the 1994 tax title and tax sale. As argued above, the 1994 tax title
contained a substantial deviation from the tax sale statutes by citing a nonexistent statute
number as giving the county authority to sell Vance Springs. (000008). As a matter of
law, this rendered the tax sale void. See Olsen v. Bagley, 37 P. 737, 740 (Utah 1894).
Every subsequent court action assumed the validity of the 1994 tax sale and the fact
finder was not presented with this defense.
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Ranger Enterprises brought a quiet title action against the Foundation and various
named members in 1996. (T-v4 p25-26). However, the court did not allow any of the
members of the Fraternity, who directed and ran the Foundation, to represent the
Foundation. (T-v2 p275). The court subsequently issued a default judgment against the
Foundation because it was not represented by counsel. (T-v4 p25-26). Plainly, the 1996
quiet title action did not benefit from any asserted defense, despite the willingness of the
members of the Fraternity to argue on behalf of the Foundation. Likewise, as discussed
above, the 1996 criminal trespass convictions and the 1999 quiet title action were decided
on the assumption that the 1994 tax deed was valid without any presentation of a defense
by Mr. Hamilton on that basis.
As a matter of law, the ownership of Vance Springs did not clearly transfer to
Ranger Enterprises and, therefore, remained in the Foundation's possession (or in the
possession of Mr. Hamilton by the operation of the subsequent warranty deeds from the
Foundation to himself). (Exs. 34, 36). Therefore, his mere presence on Vance Springs,
notwithstanding the prior convictions for criminal trespass and quiet title judgments that
were based upon the void 1994 tax sale, is so inconclusive that a conviction criminal
trespass can not be upheld. The jury's verdict is insupportable because the state's
evidence to establish Mr. Hamilton's presence was "unlawful" relied completely upon the
invalid 1994 tax deed and tax sale or directly on a prior court proceeding that based its
judgment on the assumption that the 1994 tax sale was valid, a pure question of law that
was not determined for the jury.
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4.
The court erred in denying Mr. Hamilton's motion to dismiss Count 1
of the information relating to attempted homicide when Sergeant Chambers acted
wholly outside the scope of his authority and Mr. Hamilton's actions constituted
self-defense.
Count I of the Amended Information charged Mr. Hamilton with attempted
aggravated murder based on Sergeant Chambers' status as a peace officer. On September
9, 1999, Sergeant Chambers, the alleged victim, was not acting as a peace officer and
thus as a matter of law the court should have dismissed Count 1 of the amended
information. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202. Chambers lacked legal authority to draw or
to fire his weapon during a misdemeanor or infraction investigation. When Chambers
threatened to kill Defendant and opened fire on him before Hamilton returned fire, he
violated police training and regulations governing the conduct of peace officers.
Section 76-5-202 is the primary statute governing attempted homicide and
provides in relevant part:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of
the following circumstances:
He

*

*

*

(e) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer
acting under color of legal authority or for the puipose of effecting
the defendant's or another's escape from lawful custody:
He

H«

*

*

(k) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement
officer, executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official,
firefighter, judge or other court official, juror, probation officer or
parole officer, and the victim is either on duty or the homicide is
based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, and the
actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds
or has held that official position[.]
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-202.
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Concerning interference with an arrest, Utah law provides:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or
by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a
peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that
person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required
by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention: and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or
detention: or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain
from performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305. This means that the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the officer in question was not acting wholly outside the scope of his authority
and was "doing what he was employed to do and not engaging in a personal frolic on his
own." State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991).
Utah law recognizes a distinction between detentions and arrests. A detention
merely requires a peace officer to have a reasonable suspicion to believe an individual
committed or is committing an offense to stop that individual in a public place and
demand his name, address, and an explanation. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15. However,
an arrest requires "an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission to custody [,
but] not. . . any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and detention." UTAH
CODE ANN.

§77-7-1.

However, an arrest supported by reasonable suspicion must be conducted in a
fairly regulated manner by a peace officer unless certain exceptions apply:
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(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person being
arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest him. Such
notice shall not be required when:
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life
or safety of the officer or another person or will likely enable the
party being arrested to escape:
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the
commission of or an attempt to commit, an offense: or
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the
commission of an offense or an escape.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-6.

Here, Chambers was not arresting Mr. Hamilton. In his initial contact with Mr.
Hamilton, Chambers asked merely to speak with him and he did not place him under
arrest when Mr. Hamilton drove by in his pickup. (T-v3 p621-22.) As the Defendant
drove away, Chambers, without warning or announcement, opened fire on the pickup Mr.
Hamilton was driving, shooting out two of its tires. (T-v2 p413, v3 p623).
Mr. Hamilton was not trespassing on September 9, 1999. See Argument 1 above.
Consequently, there was no basis for Chambers to attempt to stop Mr. Hamilton at Vance
Springs. Even if Mr. Hamilton were trespassing, the officer was engaged in what was at
most a misdemeanor investigation. Criminal trespass on property is a Class C
misdemeanor or an infraction. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206(2)(a), (b), (3). In
conducting such investigations, a peace officer may stop or detain a person in a public
place, when he has reasonable suspicion to believe the person has committed or is in the
act of committing a public offense. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15. However, Vance
Springs is private property, not a public place.
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In addition, Chambers exceeded his authority and accepted police practice by
using his firearm at Vance Springs. The use of guns is a clearly regulated area of police
conduct:
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being
informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting
may use reasonable force to effect arrest. Deadly force may be used
only as provided in Section 76-2-404.
UTAH CODE A N N . § 77-7-7. The referenced section governing deadly force provides:
(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid
and assistance, is justified in using deadly force when:
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to and in accordance
with the judgment of a competent court in executing a penalty of
death:
(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody
following an arrest, where the officer reasonably believes that
deadly force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated
by escape; and
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect has committed a felony offense involving the infliction of
death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe the
suspect poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer
or to others if apprehension is delayed:
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force
is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or
another person.
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by the officer prior
to any use of deadly force under Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(c).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-2-404.

"Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, that he reasonably
believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or defend himself or another from bodily harm
while making an arrest." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-403. However, an unstated intention
to arrest does not constitute an arrest or notice of an impending arrest. UTAH CODE ANN.
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§ 77-7-6. Chambers was not acting as a peace officer at the time he fired shots at Mr.
Hamilton while Hamilton was driving away from him because he had clearly exceeded
his authority.
Mr. Hamilton stopped driving the pickup soon after Chambers shot out two of its
tires. (T-v4 pi41). Mr. Hamilton observed Sergeant Chambers release the dog that was
accompanying him and saw the dog moving about. (T-v4 pi41). After Mr. Hamilton
shot the unrestrained dog, Chambers reacted by shouting, "You mother fucker. You
killed my dog. Tony, you are a dead man." (T-v3 p484). Chambers then opened fire on
Mr. Hamilton, getting off several shots before Mr. Hamilton returned fire and eventually
shot him in the leg. (T-v3 p484, v4 pi45). Once Mr. Hamilton shot Chambers in the leg,
Chambers ceased firing at him and Mr. Hamilton fired no further rounds. (T-v4 pi46).
Again, in this instance, Chambers acted entirely outside the scope of his authority.
Killing a service dog is a Class A misdemeanor, not a felony (if that was the dog's status,
see Argument 5) and Mr. Hamilton had not yet fired at the officer. UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-9-306. Thus, Chambers' use of force was unjustified at this point because he lacked
probable cause to believe that Mr. Hamilton had committed a felony offense involving
the infliction or that he threatened infliction of death or serious bodily injury to the
officer or others if apprehension were delayed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404(1 )(a), (b).
By contrast, Chambers' conduct was unlawful because it constituted threatening
another with a dangerous weapon, assault and attempted murder. UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-10-506; 76-5-103; 76-5-203. Additionally, Chambers' actions in avenging the death
of his dog could qualify as attempted aggravated murder under the "other personal gain"
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aggravating factor. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(1 )(f). Beyond the statutory restraints
upon the use of force, the United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, and the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 14, guarantee the right of persons to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Supreme Court has held that an individual cannot be convicted of a crime for failing to
obey a police officers command if that command itself is in violation of the United States
Constitution. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291, 83 S. Ct. 1240, 1245, 10 L.Ed 2d
349 (1963). Here, excessive force stripped Chambers of lawful authority, rendering his
actions illegal.
Utah law can extend protection beyond the federal Fourth Amendment with
appropriate legal and independent legal analysis of the facts and issues. State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1216 n.l 1 (Utah 1993). The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is a
limitation on government power. Consequently, when Chambers exceeded lawful
authority by firing upon Hamilton at Vance Springs, Chambers disregarded the
limitations the law placed upon him and other police officers and he therefore was not
acting within his authority as a peace officer.
The trial court's error in failing to dismiss the attempted murder charge was
compounded by its giving Instruction 39, which effectively eliminated the opportunity for
the jury to consider justification or self-defense. At the conclusion of the presentation of
evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on a variety of topics, including justification
or self-defense. Instruction number 38 essentially tracks the portions of UTAH CODE
ANN. Section 76-2-402 that provide that a person is justified in using force against
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another to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend
himself or a third person against another's imminent use of unlawful force. The trial
court also gave Instruction 39:
In evaluating the claim of self defense, you should also consider the
following:
A person may arm himself in reasonable anticipation of an unlawful
attack and he does not thereby forfeit his right to act in self defense.
Moreover, he may stand his ground and need not retreat when faced
with the apparent necessity of defending himself against unlawful
force, even though safety might more easily be gained by flight or
leaving the scene. However, the force which a person may use in
defense of self is limited as defined elsewhere in these instructions.
In addition, if a peace officer is seeking to effectuate an arrest, a
person may not "resist" unless the officer is acting wholly outside
the scope of his authority.
(000016).
The effect of this instruction was to eliminate the opportunity for the jury to
consider justification or self-defense concerning the attempted murder charge because the
instruction did not explain that self-defense was available when a peace officer was
acting outside the scope of his authority. When that occurs, the jury is entitled to
consider the case without the constraints of the instruction above, ("wholly outside the
scope of authority"). The United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, and the Utah
Constitution, Article I Section 14, provide the right of persons to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
CONST.

Amend. VI; UTAH CONST, art. I, § 14.

UTAH CODE ANN.

Section 76-5-202

escalates the degree of a criminal offense if the victim is acting under color of legal
authority as a peace officer. However, as demonstrated above, Chambers was not acting
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within the scope of his authority as a peace officer when he fired upon Mr. Hamilton in
his pickup, or when he fired upon Mr. Hamilton after the death of his dog.
The phrase: "acting under color of authority [as a peace officer]" should be
construed in light of its plain language. Alisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988); Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). If
there is nothing to construe, then there is no ambiguity in the statute permitting
construction. State v. Vigil 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992); State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d
911,912 (Utah 1974); See generally, Chris and Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax
Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511,515 (Utah 1990). Thus, a court interprets a statute in its entirety
and in accordance with its intended purpose in order to accomplish that objective.
Anders v. Alfred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (1965). Consequently, it is the duty
of a court in interpreting a statute to give effect, if such can reasonably be done, to every
word, clause and sentence of the legislative enactment. Durfey v. Board of Education of
Wayne County School District, 604 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1979); Totorica v. Thomas, 16
Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984, 987 (1965). In other words, a statute will not be severed and
considered piecemeal, but must be given effect in its entirety whenever possible. Peay v.
Board of Education ofProvo City School District, 14 Utah 2d 63, 377 P.2d 490, 492
(1962); Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, 14 Utah 2d 111,
380 P.2d 721, 724 (1963). When a court interprets a statute, it cannot read out any clause
or word whose meaning is clear. In re RickenbachTs Estate Cloward v. Oldroyt, 112 Utah
278, 186 P.2d 973, 974 (1947).
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Yet reading a portion out of the statute is what the court's instruction essentially
accomplished. Instruction 39, with a restrictive focus on the broader definition of
"justification" or "self-defense" in Instruction 38, resulted in a severe limitation of the
right of self defense. (000015, 000016) This constituted reversible error.
Presumably, the troublesome language in the instruction came from an
interpretation of State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991). However, reliance upon
that case is error. Gardiner does not apply in the strict sense because the officers had no
right to be on Vance Springs and consequently were not acting within the scope of their
authority as peace officers. See Argument 1 above. In other words, the officers had no
right to trespass on Vance Springs. Chamber's use of deadly force, when not threatened
and without cause to detain or arrest Mr. Hamilton, exceeded the scope of his authority.
The use of deadly force in a misdemeanor offense is unjustified under Utah law, as
explained above. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404.
Gardiner involved an individual's forcibly resisting a police search and dealt with
a citizen's right to resist arrest. This Court examined the common law and statutory basis
for resisting a search. State v. Gardiner,814 P.2d at 571, 576. By contrast, this case
involves the fundamental right of an individual to be secure in his person or to protect
himself against violence or from attack. Consequently, Gardiner is distinguishable and
using the Gardiner decision, as the trial court presumably did, as a basis for jury
Instruction 39, was legal error.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section 76-2-402 provides that a person has a right of
self defense:
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A person is justified in threatening or using force against another
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such
force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such
other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is
justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or to a
third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force,
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402. The two exceptions that deal with initial provocation or
attempting to commit a felony or fleeing after the commission of a felony do not apply in
this instance. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402. Nor does the exception involving an
individual's being the initial aggressor. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (l)(c). When
Chambers entered the premises, Mr. Hamilton was peaceably on the property and drove
slowly toward Chambers, but did not threaten him. (T-v4 pi39). He then drove away.
(T-v3 p621-22, v4 pi40). As Mr. Hamilton was driving away, Chambers opened fire and
deflated two of the Defendant's Ford pickup tires, thereby disabling the vehicle. (T-v2
p413,v3p623).
A dog accompanied Chambers and when Chambers released the dog, after he had
fired on Mr. Hamilton, he shot the dog. (T-v3 p482, 632, v4 pl42). Chambers then
threatened Mr. Hamilton and opened fire on him while Mr. Hamilon took cover behind
his disabled pickup. Mr. Hamilton was at that time was in reasonable and imminent fear
of his safety and life and consequently returned the fire Chambers had initiated. (T-v3
p484). Thus, Chambers initiated gunfire and was the aggressor. He had not placed Mr.
Hamilton under arrest nor announced an intention to do so and consequently his actions
were taken pursuant to, at most, a misdemeanor investigation. Under the circumstances,
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there was not resisting arrest, but simple self-defense. Gardiner addressed the issue of
resisting arrest but does not address the issue of self-defense. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 571,
576.
It is not likely that the legislature intended the self-defense provisions of UTAH
CODE ANN. Section 76-2-402 to be superfluous. This is particularly so when Chambers
initiated aggression, which was unlawful under the Constitutional rights of citizens to be
secure in their persons and residences. U.S. CONST, amend. IV; UTAH CONST. Art. I, §
14. Courts should interpret statues consistent with legislative intent and constitutional
direction. Chris and Dickfs Lumber and Hardware, 791 P.2d at 516. Moreover, the plain
language of UTAH CODE ANN. Section 76-2-402 permits the use of force when an
individual reasonably believes that he is the victim of imminent unlawful force. In
interpreting statutes, the plain language controls. Alisen, 763 P.2d at 809. The irony of
this case is that the trial court's extension of Gardiner by failing to place limits on police
behavior and by divesting citizens of their right to self-defense has the effect of escalating
violence, rather than minimizing it. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 579.
Thus, it is highly improbable that the legislature considered police officers to have
authority to engage in illegal actions such as occurred here. Id. Likewise, it is unlikely
that the legislature intended to approve an escalation of violence or of police behavior
without accountability. Gardiner does not apply to situations involving self-defense
because the case dealt only with resisting arrest. For that reason alone, and for other
constitutional and statutory reasons, it was error to apply the Gardiner rule to a situation
involving self-defense, as the trial court did here and error to fail to dismiss the charges
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of attempted murder and killing of a police dog. Furthermore, the trial court's
instructions compounded this error because they did not give the jury the opportunity to
consider the validity of Mr. Hamilton's use of self-defense. That prejudicial error
requires reversal and gives this Court the opportunity to explain the proper limitations of
the Gardiner decision.

5.
The court erred in denying Mr. Hamilton's motion to dismiss Count 4
of the information relating to killing of a service dog when the dog in question
ceased being a police service dog after Sergeant Chambers, the dog's handler, acted
wholly outside the scope of his lawful authority.

If an individual intentionally kills an animal in police service, that person has
committed a class A misdemeanor. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-306. Sergeant Chambers
took a service dog to Vance Springs on the day in question. (T-v2 p540). However, as
explained above, Chambers was not acting within his authority as a peace officer. See
argument 4. The statute granting service animal status is logically and necessarily
contingent upon the animal's handler acting within his authority as a peace officer.
When the handler was not longer acting as a peace officer, the dog that accompanied him

This Court's earlier citation to Gardiner involved distinguishable facts and little
discussion. J. H. by D. H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 125 n.38 (Utah 1992). The
Utah Court of Appeals has considered the Gardiner case on various occasions but none
appear to have dealt with the precise facts of this case. See e.g. American Fork City v.
Pena-Flores, 2000 Ut App 323, 14 P.3d 698 (2000), cert granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah
2001); State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Alonzi. 932 P.2d 606
(Utah App. 1997), affd 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998) (without analysis of this issue); State
v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1997); Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah
App. 1996), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131
(Utah App. 1991).

lost its status as a service animal and became a dog like any other without the statute's
enhanced protection.
While the statute's language does not technically draw a distinction between an
animal within and outside of service, a reasonable interpretation of the statute leads to
such a result. The animal's legal behavior and status must necessarily flow from the
legality of the police action of which the dog was a part. An animal enjoys no immunity
when its handler is no longer acting as a peace officer, just as an agent enjoys no
authority (or legitimacy) greater than its principal. To conclude otherwise could permit
accomplishing otherwise illegal actions through an agent or animal attached to a police
department. Courts should interpret statutes to avoid absurd results or those inconsistent
with legislative intent. Chris and Dick's Lumber and Hardware, 791 P.2d at 516. Thus,
the trial court erred in failing to dismiss this misdemeanor charge.

6.
The court erred by submitting the charge of aggravated assault to the
jury when Mr. Hamilton's conduct did not meet the statutory requirement of "a
show of immediate force or violence."

The state's evidence merely established that after the alteration with Sergeant
Chambers, Mr. Hamilton walked 150 yards through the fence on Vance Springs and then
leaned his gun over the fence. (T-v3 p528). The sheriff approached later and walked
within 70 yards of Mr. Hamilton, at which time Mr. Hamilton told him that was close
enough. (T-v3 p529). When attempts to talk at that distance proved too difficult, the
sheriff approached to within 30 yards and Mr. Hamilton again told him that was close
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enough. (T-v3 p530). After talking for nearly half an hour the sheriff asked if the rifle
was pointed toward him. (T-v3 p531). Mr. Hamilton told him that it was pointed above
him and then moved the rifle upon a request from the sheriff. (T-v3 p531).
The applicable statute defines an assault as "a threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5102(l)(b). While the statement, "That's close enough," seems hostile, the state failed to
show that Mr. Hamilton accompanied this statement with a show of immediate force or
violence because the rifle was resting across the fence before the sheriff approached and
Mr. Hamilton was not aiming the rifle at the sheriff. (T-v3 p528-31).
The state did not show Mr. Hamilton's statements were accompanied by moving
the rifle into a position where it constituted a show of "immediate" force or violence, as
would be the case if Mr. Hamilton had brought the gun up into a ready position. The
state also did not show that the rifle's position demonstrated any "immediate" threat as it
was not aimed at the sheriff, nor had Mr. Hamilton's statements been accompanied by a
show of the rifle's ability to be used immediately. The facts that Mr. Hamilton and the
sheriff engaged in a long conversation and that Mr. Hamilton acknowledged that the rifle
was not pointed toward the sheriff when asked and willingly moved it further away from
the sheriff upon his request clearly demonstrate how the rifle's original position could not
constitute a "show of immediate force or violence." Because the court erred in not
finding that the state failed to meet a statutory requirement of aggravated assault, it erred
in submitting that count to the jury.

49

7.
The errors at trial argued above, as a whole, constitute cumulative
error meriting reversal because they undermine the Court's confidence that a fair
trial was had.

All these errors argued above, while reversible in their own right, represent
cumulative error as a whole meriting reversal. Under this doctrine, the appellate court
will reverse the trial court judgment when "the cumulative effect of the several errors
undermines [the Court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." See State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). Here the effect of the trial court's rulings was to prevent
the jury from fairly considering Mr. Hamilton's defenses, thereby preventing the
realization of a fair trial and undermining confidence that a fair trial occurred. Thus, this
Court should reverse the trial court's judgment.

IX,

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse Mr. Hamilton's convictions
and remand the matter to the trial court for dismissal.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February/

Keith C. Barnes
250 South Main
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(435) 586-4404
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Statutes
UTAHCODEANN. §59-2-1351.1. Tax sale - Combining certain parcels - Acceptable
bids - Deeds.
(1) (a) At the time specified in the notice the auditor shall:
(i) attend at the place appointed, offer for sale, and sell all real property for
which an acceptable bid is made; and
(ii) refuse to offer a parcel of real property for sale if the description of the
real property is so defective as to convey no title.
(b) The auditor may post at the place of sale a copy of the published list of real
property to be offered and cry the sale by reference to the list rather than crying each
parcel separately.
(2) (a) The tax commission shall establish, by rule, minimum procedural standards
applicable to tax sales.
(b) For matters not addressed by commission rules, the county legislative body,
upon recommendation by the county auditor, shall establish procedures, by ordinance, for
the sale of the delinquent property that best protect the financial interest of the delinquent
property owner and meet the needs of local governments to collect delinquent property
taxes due.
(3) The county governing body may authorize the auditor to combine for sale two or
more contiguous parcels owned by the same party when:
(a) the parcels are a single economic or functional unit;
(b) the combined sale will best protect the financial interests of the delinquent
property owner; and
(c) separate sales will reduce the economic value of the unit.
(4) The governing body may accept any of the following bids:
(a) the highest bid amount for the entire parcel of property, however, a bid may
not be accepted for an amount which is insufficient to pay the taxes, penalties, interest,
and administrative costs; or
(b) a bid in an amount sufficient to pay the taxes, penalties, interest, and
administrative costs, for less than the entire parcel.
(i) The bid which shall be accepted shall be the bid of the bidder who will
pay in cash the full amount of the taxes, penalties, interest and administrative costs for
the smallest portion of the entire parcel.
(ii) The county auditor at the tax sale or the county legislative body
following the tax sale shall reject a bid to purchase a strip of property around the entire
perimeter of the parcel, or a bid to purchase a strip of the parcel which would prevent
access to the remainder of the parcel by the redemptive owner or otherwise unreasonably
diminish the value of the remainder.
(iii) If the bid accepted is for less than the entire parcel, the auditor shall
note the fact, with a description of the property covered by the bid, upon the tax sale
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record and the balance of the parcel not affected by the bid shall be considered to have
been redeemed by the owner.
(5) The county legislative body may decide that none of the bids are acceptable.
(6) Once the county auditor has closed the sale of a particular parcel of property as a
result of accepting a bid on the parcel, the successful bidder or purchaser of the property
may not unilaterally rescind the bid. The county legislative body, after acceptance of a
bid, may enforce the terms of the bid by obtaining a legal judgment against the purchaser
in the amount of the bid, plus interest and attorney's fees.
(7) Any sale funds which are in excess of the amount required to satisfy the delinquent
taxes, penalties, interest, and administrative costs of the delinquent property shall be
treated as unclaimed property under Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act.
(8) All money received upon the sale of property made under this section shall be paid
into the county treasury, and the treasurer shall settle with the taxing entities as provided
in Section 59-3-1366.
(9) (a) The county auditor shall, after acceptance by the county governing body, and
in the name of the county, execute deeds conveying in fee simple all property sold at the
public sale to the purchaser and attest this with the auditor's seal. Deeds issued by the
county auditor under this section shall recite the following:
(i) the total amount of all the delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and
administrative costs which were paid in for the execution and delivery of the deed;
(ii) the year for which the property was assessed, the year the property
became delinquent, and the year the property was subject to tax sale;
(iii) a full description of the property; and
(iv) the name of the grantee.
(b) When the deed is executed and delivered by the auditor, it shall be prima facie
evidence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent to the date of the taxes initially
became delinquent and all of the conveyance of the property to the grantee in fee simple.
(c) The deed issued by the county auditor under this section shall be recorded by
the county recorder.
(d) The fee for the recording shall be included in the administrative costs of the
sale.
(e) The deed shall be substantially in the following form:
TAX DEED
County, a body corporate and politic of the state of Utah, grantor,
hereby conveys to
, grantee, of
the following described real
estate in
County, Utah:
(Here describe the property conveyed)
This conveyance is made in consideration of payment of the grantee of
$
, representing the total amount owing for delinquent taxes, penalties, interest,
and administrative costs constituting a charge against the years
through
in the sum of $
.
Dated
(month/day/year).
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(Auditor's Seal)

County
By
County Auditor

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402.

Force in defense of person - Forcible felony defined.

(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force
is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified in
using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury
only if he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person as
a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent
the commission of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances
specified in Subsection (1) if he or she:
*F

*p

*r

*r

(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
*

*

*

*

(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection
(1), the trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the
following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily
injury[.]

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206.

Criminal Trespass

(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of the entire
body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances
not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203,
or 76-6-204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person
or damage to any property, including the use of graffiti as defined in
Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a
felony; or
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(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause
fear for the safety of another; or
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or
remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner
or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to
exclude intruders;
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the
attention of intruders.
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or
remained; and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the
owner's use of the property.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-6.

Manner of making arrest.

(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person being
arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest him. Such
notice shall not be required when:
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life
or safety of the officer or another person or will likely enable the
party being arrested to escape:
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the
commission of or an attempt to commit, an offense: or
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the
commission of an offense or an escape.
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsection 7824a-1(2), is arrested for an alleged violation of a criminal law,
including a local ordinance, the arresting officer shall assess the
communicative abilities of the hearing-impaired person and conduct
this notification, and any further notifications of rights, warnings,
interrogations, or taking of statements, in a manner that accurately
and effectively communicates with the hearing-impaired person
including qualified interpreters, lip reading, pen and paper,
typewriters, computers with print-out capability, and
telecommunications devices for the deaf.
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(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to be
considered by any court when evaluating whether statements of a
hearing-impaired person were made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.
Rules
U.R. Civ. Pro. 4(c)
(c) Contents of summons.
(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the
address of the court, the names of the parties to the action, and the
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant,
state the name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs
attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone
number. It shall state the time within which the defendant is
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the
defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be
rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed
with the court within ten days of service.
(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the
summons shall state that the defendant need no answer if the
complaint is not filed within 10 days after service and shall state the
telephone number of the clerk of the court where the defendant may
call at least 13 days after service to determine if the complaint has
been filed.
(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall
briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other relief
demanded, and that the complaint is on file with the court.
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NOTICE OP PIHAL TAX SALE
NOTICE is hereby given that on the 26th day of May, 1994, at
10:00 a.m., at the front door of the county courthouse in Beaver
County, 105 East Center, Beaver, UT 84713, I will offer for sale
at public auction and sell to the highest bidder for cash, under
the provisions of Section 59-2-1351, the following described real
estate located in the county and now held by it under preliminary
tax sale.
No bid for less than the total amount of taxes,
interest, penalty, and costs which are a charge upon the real
estate will be accepted.
ASHLEY INVESTMENTS
3025 Nordoff Cr.
Las Vegas, NV 89121
Lot 11 Unit 1 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bidi $210.75.

LV-1-11

LV-1-12
Lot 12 Unit 1 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bids $210.75.
LV-1-13
Lot 13 Unit 1 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bids $210.75.
LV-1-14
Lot 14 Unit 1 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bid: $210.75.
LV-1-15
Lot 15 Unit 1 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bids $210.75.
LV-1-16
Lot 16 Unit 1 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bidx $210.75.
MICHAEL SAYLES
Box 324
Seal Beach, CA 90740
Lot 7 Unit 7 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bid: 213.96.

LV-7-7

BRUCE & ALICE PURGESON
1315 Covina Blvd.
San Dimas, CA 91773
Lot 8 Unit 7 Lakeview Est.
Minimum Bid: $242.13.
6

LV-7-8
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LANDWAY CORP.
2737-A
P.O. Box 622
Glendora, CA 91740
Beg E 1/4 Cor Sec 21 T29S RllW th N 36 rds W 110 rds S 116
rds E 30 rds N 80 rds W 80 rds to beg. Cont. 39.75 acres.
Minimum Bid: $372,20.
IMMANOEL FOUNDATION
c/o Talmage Weis
P.O. Box 98
Milford, UT 84751

2900

All Section 16 T28S R18W SLBM.

Cont. 640 acres.

Minimum Bid: $10,166.91.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and official
seal this 22nd day of April, 1994.

Paul B. Barton
Beaver County Clerk/Auditor
Publishr April 28, May 5, 12 & 19, 1994.
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*

BEAVER COUNTY, a body corporate and p o l i t i c , of the Stat*
of Utah, Grantor, hereby conveys to
P.O. Box 580
Grantee, of
Beaver. UT 84713

Ranger Enterprises

,

t the f o l l o w ! ^

described r e a l aatate i n the County of Beaver, State of Utah, c o - w i t :

Serial #2900
All Section 16 T28S R18W SLBM.

Thin conveyance l a made in consideration of payment by tfe* Grantee
of the sua of $ is.OOP.no

> delinquent taxea, penalties, interest and

costs c o n s t i t u t i n g a charge against said real e s t a t e , which was s o l d to
said county a t preliminary sale for non payment of general taaes
aaaeaaed against i t for the year I9_p6
Dated thl»

20rh

day of

FILED FOR RECORD^

$: (Q

o'dock /Tm

in the sum of $ 406.21
June

, 19 94 .

BEAVER COUNTT, a body corpor,
and p o l i t i c of the State of tfeah

"

"

JIIN 2 0 1994
^

>» \ •»

Bssv^CoufS/Pmcordsf

FeeS

/n

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTT OF BEAVER
On t h i s

.

Beaver County Auditor

^
)
)

7ni»h

s

day of

Jupc

, 19

9

* . peisonaily

appeared before me, PAUL B. BARTOW, known to me to be the duly q u a l i f i e d
and acting County Clerk/Auditor of Beaver County, State of Utafcv the
signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me that he
executed the same i n behalf of said Beaver County by authority of Section
59-10-64, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and acts supplementary thereto.

Beaver County lecorder

J B t m County Recorder ^
[
OBUHNotarfSeai
•
j
Be«vt(UabM713
J
L Ncm--Exp.Coomoo4)08

WYNNE.BARTHOLOMEW#0233
AttorneyforPetition
Plaza I at the Sports Mall
5505 South 900 East #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 263-0569

rlLfc ^
AU6 I 9 699
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RANGER ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Petitioner,
Civil No. 990500070

vs.
TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
Respondent

Respondent, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, has failed to plead or otherwise defend
in this action and default has been entered.
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner, RANGER ENTERPRISES, INC, be awarded judgment
against said Respondent as follows:
I

The Warranty Deed dated March 24, 1999 and recorded March 26, 1999 as

Instniment No 203112, in Book 317, Page 427, of the official records of Beaver County, State
of Utah, and the "By the Declaration of the Land Patent" dated March 24, 1999 and recorded
EXHIBIT 5

March 26, 1999 as Instniment No 203113, in Book 317, Page 428 of the official records of
Beaver County, State of Utah are both declared void ab initio, and a nullity.

E S 0 4 4 1 0 §°£i& * * r ^

2.

Respondent has no ngbt, title, or interest in and to thefollowingdescribed parcel

of real property located in Beaver County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as
fellows:
Section 16, Township 28 South, Range 18 West, according to the
official records of the Beaver County Recorder, State of Utah.
3

Damages against Respondent in die sum of S3,000 00 are hereby awarded to

Petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann §38-9-1, ej ssj.
4.

The Beaver County Recorder is hereby permanently enjoinedand ordered to refuse

to accept any further liens, claims, deeds, or encumbrances of any land Sed by or in behalf of
Tony Alexander Hamilton relating to real property described above^ withoirt the express written
approval of a District Court Judge of this District
5.

Petitioner be awarded its attorney's fees in the sum of $73 5.00

6.

Petitioner be awarded its costs incurred tn the sum of S179.70

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in enibrcing or collecting said judgment by
execution or other means as shall be established by affidavit
DATED this

V~V

day of

£W*l .

1999

BY THE COURT
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF Bp

OnlGIIUL W M ^ ^ T H ^
^ "iCE (WfTfcS*&) M^H^a^QrfefiAt OF
• .c COpRT ON THIS DAT*: fftEEUdSt?.

D,StnCt C0Ult Ju(J

8e

CLERK OF COURI pR DfftOTYU^EH^^'
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EDWARD K. BRASS (432)
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)322-5678
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff,

MOTION IN LIMINE

v.
Tom-Alexander: Hamilton, a.k.a. TONY
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a.k.a.
RICHARD ADAM,

Case No. 991500129
Judge Kay L. Mclff

Defendant.
The defendant, by his attorney, moves the Court to enter an order precluding the prosecutor
from making any argument or introducing evidence contending that the defendant was trespassing
on the property where the events of September 9. 1999, occurred.
The grounds for this motion are:
1.

The statutory authority upon which the Beaver County Attorney purported to rely in

forfeiting the defendant's interest in the property does not exist. A copy of the tax deed referring to
Section 59-10-64 is attached. There is and was no such statute.
2.

The Beaver County Attorney purported to rely on the same authority in attempting

to sell or forfeit the same property in 1991. The Beaver County Attorney then rescinded the sale
based on the mistaken reliance upon a non-existent statute.
3.

The tax sale and deed are void as a matter of law.

0000011

4.

Alternatively, if the tax sale and deed are not void, Mr. Hamilton is entitled to rely

upon the decision to rescind the prior tax sale when the same mistake was made as the basis for his
belief that the later sale is void. Beaver County must be collaterally estopped from asserting the
subsequent sale is valid.
DATED this3£> day of March 2000.

Attorney for Defendant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion in Limine was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to Scott M. Burns, Special Deputy Beaver County Attorney, P.O. Box 428, Cedar
City, Utah 84720, this £ Q

day of March 2000.
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EDWARD K. BRASS (432)
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)322-5678
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 4

v.
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, a.k.a. TONY
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a.k.a.
RICHARD ADAM,

Case No. 991500129
Judge Kay L. Mclff

Defendant.
The defendant, by his attorney, moves the Court to enter an order dismissing count 4, entitled
Murder of a Service Dog, said to be in violation of UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §76-9-306. The
grounds for this motion are:
1.

The dog referred to in Count 4 was being handled by Deputy John Chambers.

2.

On September 9, 1999* Deputy John Chambers actions in drawing afirearm,firing

shots in the direction of Mr. Hamilton, and threatening to kill Mr. Hamilton, all exceeded the scope
of his authority as a peace officer. Chambers, as a matter of law ceased acting as a peace officer.
3.

Given that Chambers had ceased to act as a peace officer, his dog was not "in service"

at the time Mr. Hamilton shot it.
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DATED this&J l f day of March, 2000.

EDWARD K. BRASS
Attorney for Defendant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss Count 4 was
mailed, postage pre-paid, to Scott M. Bums, Special Deputy Beaver County Attorney, P.O. Box 428.
Cedar City, Utah 84720, this ^J%

day of March 2^Q0.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

<^<-^

THE DEFENSE OF "JUSTIFICATION" OR "SELF DEFENSE"
As to some of the charges, the defendant has raised the defense of "justification," also
known as "self defense". That is, he claims that he was justified in using force in defense of his
own person In order to evaluate the claim of justification, you need to understand the difference
between force and deadly force and when one or the other may lawfully be used by the officers
in discharging their duties and by the defendant in protection of his person. Deadly force is that
force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury The following instructions are
designed to assist you in evaluating the actions of the officers and in turn whether the defendant's
response was justified
Use of Force in Arrest.
Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, which he reasonably
believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or another from bodily harm while
making an arrest.
Peace Officer's Use of Deadly Force.
A peace officer is justified in using deadly force when.
(1) effecting an arrest where
(a) the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to
prevent the arrest from being defeated by escape, and
(b) the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of
death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others if apprehension is
delayed;
or
(2) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.
Justified Force in Defense of One's Person.
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself against such other's imminent use of
unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using deadly force only if he reasonably
believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself as a result of
the other's imminent use of unlawful force.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified in Subsection
(I) if he is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted
commission of a felony.
(3) In determining the reasonableness under Subsection (1), the jury may consider, but is
not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily
injury.
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INSTRUCTION NO ^

'

FURTHER FACTORS RELATING TO
THE CLAIM OF SELF DEFENSE

In evaluating the claim of self defense, you should also consider the following:
A person may arm himself in reasonable anticipation of an unlawful attack and he does
not thereby forfeit his right to act in self defense. Moreover, he may stand his ground and need
not retreat when faced with the apparent necessity of defending himself against unlawful force,
even though safety might more easily be gained by flight or leaving the scene. However, the
force which a person may use in defense of self is limited as defined elsewhere in these
instructions. In addition, if a peace officer is seeking to effectuate an arrest, a person may not
"resist" unless the officer is acting wholly outside the scope of his authority.
Finally, a claim of self defense does not shift the burden of proof in the case. That burden
remains on the prosecution. If, based upon the evidence of the entire case, there is reasonable
doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in self defense, he is entitled to a not guilty verdict
on the charge or charges to which that defense applies.

Instroct-seldef
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FILE
SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283)
Special Beaver County Prosecutor
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435)586-6694
Telecopier: (435)586-2737

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SXATEOFUTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

)

vs.

)

TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
a.k.a. Tony-Alexander: Hamilton,

)

Criminal No. 991500129

)

Judge K. L. Mclff by Appointment

Defendant

The Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a.k.a. Tony-Alexander Hamilton,
having been originally charged with ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First-Degree
Felony; ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT, a Third-Degree Felony, MURDER OF A SERVICE DOG, a Class A Misdemeanor;
INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER, a Class B Misdemeanor, and CRIMINAL
TRESPASS, a Class C Misdemeanor, and the Defendant having entered pleas of not guilty, and the
Court having thereafter scheduled a jury trial, and the Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, aJca. Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, having appeared before the Court and a jury
between the dates of March 27,2000, and April 1,2000, and the Defendant having been represented
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by attorney Edward K. Brass, and the State of Utah having been represented by Special Beaver
County Prosecutor Scott M Bums, and upon completion of said jury trial, die jury having
deliberated and returned verdicts of guilty on Count 1, ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER,
a First-Degree Felony; Count 3, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third-Degree Felony; Count 4,
MURDER OF A SERVICE DOG, a Class A Misdemeanor, Count 5, INTERFERENCE WITH
ARRESTING OFFICER, a Class B Misdemeanor, and Count 6, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, a Class
C Misdemeanor; and the jury having returned a verdict of not guilty on Count 2, ATTEMPTED
AGGRAVATED MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, and upon entry of said verdicts by the Court,
die Court having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report prior to sentencing,
and upon completion of said report, the Court having called the matter on for sentencing on May 18,
2000, in Richfield, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
a.k.a. Tony-Alexander. Hamilton, having appeared before the Court in person together with his
attorney of record Edward K. Brass, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Special
Beaver County Prosecutor Scott M. Bums, and the Court having reviewed the presentence
investigation report in detail and having further reviewed the file in detail, and the Court having
heard statements from all parties and being fully advised in the premises,.now makes and enters the
following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, TONY
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, aJca. Tony-Alexander. Hamilton, has been convicted of the offenses
ofATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER,aFim-DegreeFdony;AGGRAVATEDASSAULT,
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A Third-Degree Felony; MURDER OF A SERVICE DOG, a Class A Misdemeanor,
INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER, a Class B Misdemeanor, and CRIMINAL
TRESPASS, a Class C Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the
contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged trmt me Defendam is guilty as charged
and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a-Jca.
Tony-Alexander Hamilton, and pursuant to his conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED
MURDER, a First-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State
Prison for a period of five (5) years to life, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the
Utah State Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, aJca.
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, and pursuant to his conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a ThirdDegree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period
of zero (0) to five (5) years.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a±.a.
Tony-Alexander Hamilton, and pursuant to his conviction of MURDER OF A SERVICE DOG, a
Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Beaver County Jail for
a period of one (1) year.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, a.fca.Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, and pursuant to his conviction of INTERFERENCE WITH
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JIRESTTNG OFFICER, a Class B Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration in
the Beaver County Jail for a period of six (6) months.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ac Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, aJca.
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, and pursuant to his conviction of CRIMINAL TRESPASS, a Class C
Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Beaver County Jail for a period
of ninety (90) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fines shall be imposed.
T IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentences set forth above shall all be served
concurrentlyIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall pay restitution, to the Workmen's
Compensation Fund of Utah, in the amount of$
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TO THE SHERIFF OF BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, TONY ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, aJta. Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper,
Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence,
and Commitment.
DATED this

ft
{(_)

day of May, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

K. L. Mci
District Court Judge
-40000020

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF BEAVER

)

I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth M f c U District Court in and for Baver

Judgment Sentence, and C o n s e n t in the ease entiled S a ^ L I I t ^ . Tony * • „ - ,

Hamilton aKa Tom^lnmodcr Helton ca naM ]N..99i500i29,n»wo a fiieandof re c«iin
my office.
OTTNESS .ny hand and the seal of said office in Beaver, County of Beaver, State of «ah,
day of May, 2000.

&^/c^3c^bdl.
CAROLmtftJLLOCH
District Comt Clerk

i^2Z^

' « &

ks

Deputy District Court Clerk
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FILED
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EDWARD K. BRASS (432)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)322-5678

00 MAY 26 PK!£29

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
V

Tony-Alexander: Hamilton,
a.k-a. TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
a.k,a. RICHARD ADAM,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 991500129

|

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Tony A. Hamilton, Defendant/Appellant in ihe aboveentitled action, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court fiom the final judgment and conviction
(or order) rendered against him on the 1ZA day of May, 2000 by the Honorable Kay L. MclfF, Judge,
Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Beaver County, State of Utah.
DATED this ^ ?

day of May 2000.

ED WAKETK. BRASS " ' '"^
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
L. hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal
to ihe Scott M. Burns, Special Deputy Beaver County Attorney, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah
84720 and the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and the
Supreme Court Clerk, Utah Supreme Court, 450 South Sarte Street 5* Floor, Salyfc&eldfry, XJtah
84114 this § 2 L day °f May 2000.
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